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LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
RESULTING FROM ACTS OF EMPLOYEES
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the apparent
inadequacy of compensatory damages to provide an adequate measure
of justice in every case led to the development of punitive damages.,
At least three theories have been advanced to explain the advent of
punitive damages. According to one theory, punitive damages resulted
from the reluctance of English courts to overturn verdicts clearly in
excess of the actual pecuniary loss when malice, oppression, gross fraud
or reckless and wanton misconduct were present.2 Another theory
posits that punitive damages arose from a perceived need to award
damages for injury to feelings as well as to person or property.3 A
third theory is that punitive damages arose as a method of justifying
the award of damages for injuries such as pain and suffering which are
inherently difficult to ascertain under normal compensatory theories.4
Punitive damages are now awarded in all but four states5 in cases
in which a tort is committed intentionally, willfully or maliciously, or
with reckless disregard for the well-being of others.6 In most jurisdic-
tions punitive damages are awarded for the dual purposes of punish-
ment and deterrence. 7 However, some courts have held that punitive
damages are awarded to compensate for injured feelings, 8 or to com-
pensate for injuries which are aggravated solely because of the manner
I. For a general discussion of the policies underlying the assessment of punitive damages
see I SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, §§ 347-388 (1912); STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY; PERSONAL
INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS, §§ 177-202 (1972); 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, §§ 390-412 (2d ed.
1916).
2. See, e.g., Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873). Apparently the early English courts chose to
defer to the informed judgments of juries who were chosen because of their familiarity with the
dispute. As a result, juries were able to give expression to their heightened feelings in particularly
offensive cases.
3. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
4. See, e.g., Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885).
5. The four states which do not permit the awarding of punitive damages are: Louisiana,
Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Massachusetts,
Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Nebraska, Rieve v. McCor-
mick, II Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); and Washington, Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d
282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946).
6. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281
Ky. 583, 136 S.W.2d 759 (1939); McFadden v. Tate, 350 Mich. 84, 85 N.W.2d 181 (1957); and
Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918).
7. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
824 (1954); O'Brien v. Howell, 92 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); West Bros. v. Barefield, 239 Miss. 530,
124 So. 2d 474 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Wright v. Hollywood Cemetery Corp., 112 Ga. 884, 38 S.E. 94 (1901).
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in which they were inflicted.9 Thus, when individuals are acting on
their own behalf, punitive damages are assessed for acts which are ma-
licious, reckless, or wanton.
An issue which has frequently been raised is whether punitive
damages will lie against an employer when an employee acts willfully
while within the scope of his employment. This note will examine that
question and the authorities which have permitted punitive damages to
be assessed against an employer. The various theories under which
employers have been held liable for punitive damages for torts commit-
ted by their employees will be analyzed; the rationale underlying these
theories will be critically examined; and recommendations will be
made as to when, and under what circumstances, punitive damages
should continue to be assessed against employers for their employees'
torts.
THEORIES HOLDING EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A large number of jurisdictions have adopted the position that an
employer is not liable for punitive damages unless he has, by some in-
tentional act, implicated himself in the tort of the employee. The
Supreme Court decision most often cited for this proposition is Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Prentice.'0 The plaintiff in
Prentice, a doctor who had traveled to Chicago from Ohio on the de-
fendant railroad, was arrested shortly before his arrival in Chicago by a
police officer who was also an employee of the railroad. The arrest was
not authorized by a warrant and was carried out under circumstances
which were humiliating to the plaintiff." Apparently, the plaintiff's
only offense was to purchase return trip tickets for himself and mem-
bers of his party while traveling on excursion tickets. The tickets which
he purchased did not purport to be non-transferable and no offense
against the railroad was committed. 12 Nevertheless, upon his arrival
in Chicago, the plaintiff was taken to a police station and charged with
disorderly conduct. The charges were dropped for want of prosecution
the following day, and the plaintiff then brought an action against the
railroad in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois 13 for
trespass on the case to recover damages for the "wanton and oppres-
9. See, e.g., Lucas v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893), and Tenhopen
v. Walker, 96 Mich. 236, 55 N.W. 657 (1893).
10. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
11. Id. at 102.
12. Id.
13. The old circuit courts were replaced by district courts pursuant to the Judicial Code of
1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1152 (1911).
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sive" acts of the railroad's employee.' 4
The plaintiffs contention was that since the railroad's employees
were acting within the scope of their employment, the railroad was lia-
ble for their acts and the damages resulting therefrom.' 5 The railroad
admitted that the arrest was wrongful and that the plaintiff was entitled
to damages, but objected to jury instructions which referred to the rail-
road, rather than its employees, as acting in an unlawful and oppressive
manner.16 Judgment was entered upon a verdict for the plaintiff and
the railroad appealed.
Applying federal law, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of
the lower court, stating that since punitive damages are awarded to
punish the offender and not to compensate the victim, they can prop-
erly be assessed only against "one who has participated in the of-
fense." 17  An employer may be liable for compensatory damages but
"he is not liable to be punished by exemplary damages for an intent in
which he did not participate."' 8 The jury instructions questioned by
the railroad were held to be error because they failed to require proof
by the plaintiff that "the defendant in any way participated in, ap-
proved, or ratified the conductor's treatment of the plaintiff. . . ."9
From this holding some thirteen states have developed the rule that
unless an employer authorizes or subsequently ratifies the acts of his
employee, thereby manifesting malicious or fraudulent intent, he can-
not be held liable for punitive damages.20
The rule enunciated in Prentice established at least two voluntary
acts for which an employer may be held liable for punitive damages:
prior authorization and subsequent ratification. In addition, the
Prentice opinion alluded to a third act which has been expressly
14. 147 U.S. at 101-02, 117.
15. Id. at 111.
16. Id. at 107.
17. Id.
18. Id at 110.
19. Id at 117.
20. Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Dobbins, 78 Ark. 553, 95 S.W. 788 (1906); Ristine v.
Blocker, 15 Colo. App. 224, 61 P. 486 (1900); Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369,
42 A. 67 (1899); Woodward v. Ragland, 5 App. D.C. 220 (1895); Kealoha v. Halawa Plantation, 24
Haw. 579 (1918); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830 (1914); Jones v.
Shannon, 55 Mont. 225, 175 P. 882 (1918); Haver v. Central Ry., 64 N.J.L. 312, 45 A. 593 (1900);
Voves v. Great Northern Ry., 26 N.D. 110, 143 N.W. 760 (1913); Cleveland Ry. v. Wiesenberger,
15 Ohio App. 437 (1922); Staples v. Schmid, 18 R.I. 224, 26 A. 193 (1893); Willett v. Village of St.
Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A. 72 (1897); Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S.E. 757
(1893).
Similar rules have been adopted by at least four other states without express reference to
Prentice. See Jackson v. Smith, 75 Ala. 97 (1883); Williams v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 40 La.
Ann. 87, 3 So. 631 (1888); Ricketts v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S.E. 801 (1890); and
Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 330 (1860).
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adopted in later decisions, namely the hiring or retention of an em-
ployee unsuitable for the position which he holds.21 In order to under-
stand what constitutes an act sufficient to expose an employer to
liability for punitive damages, it is necessary to examine each potential
ground of liability in some detail.
Prior Authorization
An employer may be held to have authorized his employee's mali-
cious or wanton act if there is evidence of some express instruction to
do the act.22 In the case of a corporate employer, many states require
that the instruction must be given by an officer of the corporation or
someone with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, and must
be given within the course of the officer's or agent's employment.23 If
there is no evidence of express instruction or approval, authorization
may be implied from conduct of the employer indicating an intent that
the employee should commit the injury-causing act.24
If authorization is to be inferred from the employer's conduct, the
employer's intent to cause injury must be clearly evident before puni-
tive damages will be assessed. Ownership of a business, absent any
showing that the owner approved his salesman's questionable tactics,
has been held insufficient to make an employer liable for punitive dam-
ages. In Stewart v. Potter,25 the defendant's salesman had sold the
plaintiff a used and repossessed car, while representing to the plaintiff
that the car was new. The trial court held that the employer was liable
in punitive damages "since he owned the business. ' 26 On appeal, the
New Mexico Supreme Court, following the Prentice ruling, held that
ownership alone did not constitute participation in the act of the em-
ployee. 27 The missing element in Stewart was any showing that the
employer in some way shared the wrongful motives clearly attributable
to the employee. 28
21. 147 U.S. at 117. "In the case at bar, the plaintiff does not appear to have contended at
the trial, or to have introduced any evidence tending to show, that the conductor was known to the
defendant to be an unsuitable person in any respect. ... Id. See also text accompanying notes
92-97 infra.
22. See, e.g., Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887); Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa.
18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
23. 147 U.S. at 114. See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Froelich, 273 F.2d 92
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
24. See, e.g., Wright v. Crown Co., 267 A.2d 347 (D.C. 1970); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Froelich, 273 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
25. 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
26. Id. at 468, 104 P.2d at 741.
27. Id.
28. Id at 466, 104 P.2d at 740.
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Even the fact that the employer has authorized a particular act
does not necessarily imply that he also intended that the act be carried
out in a wrongful manner. In Wright v. Crown,2 9 the defendant owed
the plaintiff a small sum for the purchase of certain merchandise. The
plaintiff's employee made a number of telephone calls to the defendant
in an effort to collect the balance due. The defendant testified that the
calls were made in an abusive manner and resulted in mental and phys-
ical suffering on her part. When the plaintiff sued for the balance due,
the defendant filed a counterclaim for damages for invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of mental and physical suffering, and for a viola-
tion of a state blackmail statute.30 The plaintiff received a directed
verdict for the balance due and the jury returned a verdict of $125 for
the defendant on the counterclaim. 31 Among other issues on appeal,
the defendant contended that the District of Columbia trial judge erred
in refusing to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury.32
The appellate court affirmed, noting that "the mere fact that it [plain-
tiff/employer] had knowledge or even encouraged its employees to con-
tact its debtors does not make [plaintifi liable for punitive damages." 33
The court held that such evidence was insufficient at law to permit
presentation of the issue of punitive damages to the jury because there
was no showing that the plaintiff was even aware of the actions of its
employee. 34 Despite the fact that the employer in Wright had admit-
tedly authorized the telephone calls made by its employee, there was no
evidence that the employer had thereby intended the calls to be made
in a malicious or abusive manner.35
Even in the absence of instructions by an employer for an em-
ployee to undertake a specific act, authorization has been inferred from
pre-existing policy statements issued by the employer. In Allard v.
Church of Scientology of Caifornia,36 the corporate defendant had a
formal, written policy that a person leaving the organization without
permission was to become "fair game" and could be "tricked, sued...
lied to or destroyed." 37 When Allard actually left the organization,
taking certain records with him to be turned over to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, he was charged by an agent of the organization with grand
29. 267 A.2d 347 (D.C. 1970).
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 347, 349.
32. Id. at 350.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
36. 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
37. Id. at 443 n.l, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 800 n.1.
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theft of a quantity of foreign currency and arrested. The charges were
eventually dismissed "in the interests of justice, ' 38 whereupon Allard
sued the church for malicious prosecution. Judgment was entered on a
verdict for Allard, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages,
and the church appealed.3 9 Citing the aforementioned "fair game"
policy, the California appellate court found ample evidence from
which authorization could be implied.40 There was no evidence of any
express authorization to falsely accuse the plaintiff, but authorization
was inferred from the formally stated policy of the corporation.
Prior authorization of his employee's acts, therefore, may subject
an employer to punitive damages when there is evidence of express
instruction by the employer for the employee to act in a malicious or
reckless manner.4 1 The express instruction to do a specific act may be
insufficient if there is no evidence to indicate that the employer in-
tended the act to be done in a wrongful manner.42 However, authori-
zation may be found absent any express statement authorizing an
employee to act. 43 The key element is authorization, whether express
or implied, by an employer, of the wrongful intent manifested by his
employee's act.
Subsequent Ratification
Subsequent ratification of an employee's conduct is the second
voluntary act specified in Prentice.44 Like authorization, ratification
may also be express or implied, although few employers are likely to
expressly ratify an act with the knowledge that ratification would make
them liable for punitive damages. The two elements which are gener-
ally held to be necessary before ratification may be implied are knowl-
edge and intent.45 As to the former, an employer must have
knowledge of both his employee's act and its wrongful nature. 46 In the
case of a corporate employer, the act must be brought to the attention
of an officer or agent who has the power to act on behalf of the corpora-
38. Id at 444, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
39. Id. at 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
40. Id. at 452, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
41. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
44. 147 U.S. at 117.
45. Ristine v. Blocker, 15 Colo. App. 224, 61 P. 486 (1900); Haines v. Schultz, 50 N.J.L. 481,
14 A. 488 (1888).
46. See Paul v. Southern Ry., 158 S.C. 550, 155 S.E. 884 (1930); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Reed,
80 Tex. 362, 15 S.W. 1105 (1891); Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877).
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tion.47 In the absence of actual knowledge, it may be shown that the
employer demonstrated an intent to assume the risk associated with the
employment of a particular person without inquiry into the employee's
acts and their consequences. 48 Secondly, in addition to knowledge of
the act itself, there must be a showing that the employer intended to
ratify his employee's act.49 For example, retention of an employee af-
ter the commission of a wrongful act may be evidence from which
ratification may be inferred if by such retention the employer manifests
an intent to ratify the wrongful act. However, if another reason for re-
tention may be shown, ratification may not be found.50
Knowledge of the Act
Ratification may be found only when actual knowledge of the acts
of his employee has been brought to the attention of the employer or
his agent. In Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,5' the plaintiff, a
crippled man, was summarily removed by a brakeman in a rude and
violent manner from the ladies' car of the defendant's train.5 2 The
brakeman's action was reported to the conductor at the time of the inci-
dent and that notice later was held to be sufficient notice to the defend-
ant to support a finding of ratification.5 3  The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had held, on an earlier interlocutory appeal, 54 that a conductor
was in charge of his train "as the corporation itself," and the railroad
was fully responsible for his acts.55 As a result, notice to the conductor
constituted sufficient notice to the railroad to indicate ratification when
the offending brakeman was retained in the same capacity, despite the
fact that the conductor had no power to discharge the offender. 56 The
Bass court also indicated that service of the plaintiff's verified com-
plaint upon the railroad shortly after the incident would also have con-
47. See 147 U.S. at 114; Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194
P.2d 281 (1948); Dillingham v. Anthony, 73 Tex. 47, 11 S.W. 139 (1889).
48. See Will v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P.2d 478 (1951); Rickman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
124 Mont. 451, 227 P.2d 607 (1951).
49. See Kilpatrick v. Haley, 66 F. 133 (8th Cir. 1895); Shoopman v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 169 Cal. App. 2d 848, 338 P.2d 3 (1959); Woodward v. Ragland, 5 App. D.C: 220 (1895);
Ricketts v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 33 W. Va. 439, 10 S.E. 801 (1890); Bass v. Chicago & Northwest-
ern Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877).
50. Voves v. Great Northern Ry., 26 N.D. 110, 143 N.W. 760 (1913); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Reed, 80 Tex. 362, 15 S.W. 1105 (1891).
51. 42 Wis. 654 (1877). See also Garcia v. Samson's, Inc., 10 Wis. 2d 515, 103 N.W.2d 565
(1960).
52. 42 Wis. at 667-68.
53. Id. at 668-69.
54. Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874).
55. 42 Wis. at 669.
56. Id.
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stituted knowledge adequate to indicate ratification.57
In Rickman v. Safeway Stores,5 8 neither the corporate defendant
nor its agent, the manager of one of its retail stores, had actual knowl-
edge of the malicious nature of its employee's actions. However, the
store manager was fully aware that the actions had been undertaken
and actually participated to a certain extent 5 9 Adequate notice was
found because a minimal investigation by the store manager would
have indicated that the act in question was wrongful.60
The plaintiff in Rickman cashed a check at one of the defendant's
stores. The check was returned by the drawee bank with an erroneous
notation that there was no such account in that bank.61 Thereafter, the
store manager assisted his employee in a feeble attempt at investiga-
tion, but he did not contact either the bank or the plaintiff. Eventually,
the employee instituted criminal proceedings to collect the amount
due.62 When these proceedings were dismissed, the plaintiff brought
an action for malicious prosecution, seeking both compensatory and
punitive damages. The defendants appealed from entry of a judgment
for plaintiff and denial of motions for a new trial. 63 The Montana
court held that the store manager was chargeable with making a thor-
ough personal investigation into the grounds for the charges prior to
instituting the criminal action. Since he permitted, and even en-
couraged, the employee to institute the proceedings without personally
verifying the grounds therein, he accepted responsibility on behalf of
the corporation for liability if the charges were without probable cause.
Therefore, he essentially "waived" the element of knowledge and rati-
fied the act of his employee. 64
Intent to Ratify
The second essential element of ratification is the intent to ratify. 65
In a few isolated cases, the employer, by act or by oral or written order,
expressly ratifies the act of his employee, 66 but such cases are rare.
The more common situation involves an action by an employer from
which ratification could be inferred. Most of the reported cases in-
57. Id at 669-70.
58. 124 Mont. 451, 227 P.2d 607 (1951).
59. Id. at 458, 227 P.2d at 611.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 457, 227 P.2d at 609-10.
62. Id. at 459, 227 P.2d at 612.
63. Id. at 456, 227 P.2d at 609.
64. Id. at 461-62, 227 P.2d at 613.
65. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
66. See Norfolk & W.R.R. Co. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S.E. 757 (1893).
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volve either retention by the employer of the benefits of the employee's
wrongful act or retention of the employee himself after the receipt of
notice of his wrongful act.
Retention of the benefits received as a result of an employee's
wrongful act may be evidence of an intent to ratify sufficient to subject
an employer to punitive damages. The key is whether the retention is
with knowledge of the manner in which the benefits were obtained. In
Kilpatrick v. Haley6 7 the plaintiff was in possession of a hotel and its
contents following a series of transactions involving chattel mortgages
on the contents of the hotel.68 Defendant's agent forcibly entered the
hotel and removed most of its contents in a violent manner, delivering
the contents to the defendant's warehouse. The defendant retained the
goods and appropriated them to his own use under a claim of right
based upon the chattel mortgages.69 Construing Colorado law the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "The conduct of the agent...
was reckless, wanton, and unlawful, and the acts of that person he [the
principal or employer] has approved and adopted by receiving and re-
taining the property with full knowledge of the manner in which it had
been obtained. ' 70 It should be noted that the retention of benefits
alone was not the basis for finding ratification. The decisive factor was
the retention of the benefits with the knowledge of the manner in which
they were obtained. Thus the necessity of both knowledge and intent
is underscored again.
Retention of an offending employee may also indicate an intent to
ratify his offensive conduct and, if coupled with the element of knowl-
edge, may expose an employer to liability for punitive damages. 7' An
additional element is necessary, though, an element which shows that
the employer "participated in the motive which actuated the employee
in the commission of the wrongful act for which exemplary damages
are claimed."'72 The exact nature of this additional element varies
from case to case depending upon the factual setting.
In Woodward v. Ragland,73 for example, the only evidence of
67. 66 F. 133 (8th Cir. 1895).
68. Id. at 134-35.
69. Id. at 140.
70. Id See also Will v. Hughes, n. 48 supra.
71. See, e.g., Shoopman v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 169 Cal. App. 2d 848, 338 P.2d 3 (1959);
Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 42 A. 67 (1899); Donivan v. Manhattan Ry., I
Misc. 368, 21 N.Y.S. 457 (1893); Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946);
Downey v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 28 W. Va. 732 (1886).
72. Woodward v. Ragland, 5 App. D.C. 220, 237 (1895). See also Safeway Stores v. Gibson,
118 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1955).
73. 5 App. D.C. 220 (1895).
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ratification was the fact that the employee had been criminally prose-
cuted for his wrongful act, his employer had retained him thereafter,
and his employer was defending him in the case which was being ap-
pealed. While the District of Columbia court of appeals held that this
evidence was admissible to prove ratification, it also indicated that
other evidence should have been noted in the instruction in question in
order to prevent undue weight being given to such evidence.7 4  The
additional evidence mentioned by the court included the result of the
criminal prosecution and some indication that the employer had really
undertaken the employee's defense in the civil case.75 Thus the court
seemed to be saying that the real question was the reason for the em-
ployee's retention and what the employer really intended his actions to
mean.
A similar situation was present in Williams v. Pullman's Palace Car
Co. 76 The plaintiff claimed that mere retention of the employee after
the employer had learned of his alleged misconduct constituted ratifica-
tion.77 In response to this contention, the court pointed out that the
plaintiff and the employee differed greatly in their versions of the inci-
dent and that there were no eyewitnesses. Therefore, the employer's
retention of the employee was not an indication of ratification, but an
indication that it accepted its employee's version and believed that no
wrongful act had been committed by him. Yet the court did point out
that a subsequent willful act by that employee would probably subject
the employer to punitive damages. 78 The court impliedly commended
the employer for attempting "to preserve the status quo until the judi-
cial determination of the dispute."'79 In this case, both knowledge of
the wrongful act of the employee and some evidence of the employer's
intent to ratify were present, but the employer did not accept the plain-
tiff's characterization of the employee's act as wrongful. As a result
intent to ratify was found to be lacking where the employer reasonably
believed that the employee's act did not constitute a willful act.
A similar policy consideration was present in Voves v. Great North-
ern Ry. 80 The employee in Voves had been with the corporate defend-
74. Id. at 236-37. The court indicated that such facts were admissible to prove ratification,
but should be accompanied by "a statement by the court of its nature, purpose and weight.
Id. at 237.
75. Id
76. 40 La. Ann. 87, 3 So. 631 (1888).
77. Id at 93, 3 So. at 636.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 26 N.D. 110, 143 N.W. 760 (1913). See also Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 23
N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1946).
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ant for thirteen years and had a good work record with no previous
reports of misconduct. He became involved in an altercation with the
plaintiff which resulted in the employee's striking the plaintiff and
causing minor injuries. 8' The employee reported his version of the in-
cident to the company the day after it occurred. Unspecified managers
of the employer examined the incident and retained the employee, an
act which the plaintiff claimed constituted ratification. 82 The court
held that the evidence did not establish ratification, pointing out the
harsh effect such a ruling would have on employees if an employer
were faced with liability for punitive damages whenever an employee
was charged with a malicious act, unless the employer immediately dis-
charged the employee.83
Retention was found to constitute ratification in Coats v. Construe-
tion & General Laborers Local 185.84 The key to the decision appears
to have been other activities of the employer which indicated an intent
to ratify. The plaintiff in Coats was a union member who questioned
the policies of the union leadership. As a result he was harassed, re-
fused jobs, and eventually severely beaten by two employees of the
union executive board.85 Plaintiff sought to hold the union liable for
punitive damages as a result of the beating. Despite knowledge of the
beating in question, and other beatings as well, the union board re-
tained the employees. 86 That retention, together with a continuing
campaign of harassment, constituted ratification by the employer, ac-
cording to the court.87 The key point to note is that additional evi-
dence was introduced which clearly showed an intent to ratify on the
part of the employer, coupled with evidence that the union board was
well aware that the employees were likely to commit an assault.
Thus, retention by itself is generally not enough to hold an em-
ployer liable in punitive damages. In addition, it is necessary to show
an intent to ratify by some additional evidence. In Coats the continu-
ing harassment of the plaintiff by the defendant employer, coupled
with the union's knowledge of previous acts of violence perpetrated by
the employees, was sufficient to show intent.8 8 The Coats court was
persuaded that these actions by the employer showed its approval of
81. 26 N.D. 110, 114, 143 N.W. 760, 761 (1913).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 120, 143 N.W. at 763.
84. 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
85. Id. at 911-12, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41.
86. Id. at 913, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 915-16, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
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the wrongful acts. On the other hand, in Woodward,89 Williams,90 and
Voves,9 1 merely defending an employee or believing his version indi-
cated only that the employer chose to support its employee until the act
was shown to be malicious.
Negligent Hiring of an Unfit Person
The third voluntary act which, in addition to authorization and
ratification, may subject an employer to liability for punitive damages
is the negligent hiring of an unfit person. Negligent hiring differs from
ratification by retention in that retention may result in liability regard-
less of the employer's prior knowledge of the employee's fitness, while
an employer's negligent hiring may result in his liability principally be-
cause he had prior knowledge of the employee's unfitness but hired
him nevertheless. 92
In Woodward v. Ragland,93 for example, the court stated that an
employer had a duty to "show that he has been prudent and careful in
selecting his subordinates . . .94 and held that evidence regarding an
employer's execution of his duty should be presented to the jury.9 5
Similarly, the Ohio appellate court in Cleveland Railway v.
Wiesenberger96 stated that an employer could be liable for punitive
damages if the employee who acted wrongfully "was known . . . , or
ought to have been known . . . , to be an unfit person and a person
likely to commit outrages. . .. ,,97 Although there is a paucity of
cases, it appears that at least some jurisdictions recognize a duty on the
part of employers to use due care in hiring their employees, the breach
of which duty could result in liability for punitive damages.
Liability Without Intentional Act of Employer
While some voluntary act by an employer is frequently required,
the general rule in a significant number of states is that employers are
liable for punitive damages for the acts of their employees regardless of
89. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
92. Since most decisions based on this theory are from states which have adopted the position
of the Restatement of Torts (1934), liability based upon negligent hiring will be discussed in that
portion of this note. See text accompanying notes 112-21 infra. However, the theory warrants
some attention here because there are cases decided prior to the publication of the Restatement
which impose a duty to exercise care in hiring employees.
93. 5 App. D.C. 220 (1895).
94. Id. at 234.
95. Id. at 237-38.
96. 15 Ohio App. 437 (1922).
97. Id. at 443.
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any voluntary act of their own either to authorize or to ratify the em-
ployee's actions.98 Under this broad rule of liability, punitive damages
may be imposed upon an employer when an employee, acting within
the scope of his employment, commits an act for which punitive dam-
ages could be assessed against him individually.99 In some states there
is a further requirement that the act be done for the employer's benefit
or in furtherance of his business.'0°
In those states which require authorization or ratification for the
assessment of punitive damages against employers, a major concern is
whether the employer has shown some degree of fault or has somehow
participated in the wrongful motive attributed to his employee.' 0 1 It is
frequently stated that since punitive damages are intended to punish
the wrongdoer, they should be allowed only against parties who are
chargeable with some wrongdoing. 0 2  In contrast, in the states which
do not require ratification or authorization, the courts tend to assume
that by hiring another person to assist in doing business with the pub-
lic, an employer has accepted the possibility of being charged with his
employee's wrongdoing. In Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 10 3 the plaintiff, a state senator, sought to hold the defendant tele-
graph company liable in punitive damages for a libelous telegram
98. Arizona, Southern Pac. Co. v. Boyce, 26 Ariz. 162, 223 P. 116 (1924); Delaware, Ford v.
Charles Warner Co., 15 Del. (I Marv.) 88, 37 A. 39 (1893); Florida, Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 S.2d
291 (Fla. 1971); Georgia, Gasway v. Atlantic & W.P. Ry., 58 Ga. 216 (1877); Kansas, Wheeler &
Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan. 350, 13 P. 609 (1887); Kentucky, Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton,
112 Ky. 588, 66 S.W. 388 (1902); Maine, Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Mary-
land, Boyer v. Coxen, 92 Md. 366,48 A. 161 (1901); Massachusetts, Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass.
518 (1874); Minnesota, Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 75 Minn. 368, 77 N.W. 985 (1899);
Mississippi, New Orleans, J. & G.N. Ry. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 (1866); Nevada, Forrester v.
Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 P. 753 (1913); North Carolina, Hairston v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942); Oklahoma, Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Vosberg,
132 Okla. 196, 270 P. 58 (1928); Pennsylvania, Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d
846 (3d Cir. 1964); South Carolina, Rucker v. Smoke, 37 S.C. 377 (1892); Tennessee, Memphis St.
Ry. v. Stratton, 131 Tenn. 620, 176 S.W. 105 (1915).
99. Eg., Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 200, 184 N.W. 964 (1921).
In many states this rule was first established in cases involving injuries sustained by passen-
gers as a result of willful acts of employees of common carriers. See, e.g., New Orleans, J. &
G.N. Ry. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 (1866); Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 P. 753
(1913); Memphis St. Ry. v. Stratton, 131 Tenn. 620, 176 S.W. 105 (1915). These cases generally
held that common carriers owed their passengers a special duty to exercise great care to avoid
injury, and punitive damages were assessed when that special duty was violated. However, the
rule established in these common carrier cases was not thereafter limited to such cases. See, e.g.,
Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1974). The special duty owed by common carriers still
exists (see, e.g., McCoy v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977)), but the
rule regarding an employer's liability for punitive damages has been extended beyond the limited
circumstances in which it was initially established.
100. E.g., Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942).
101. Eg., Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 466, 104 P.2d 736, 740 (1940).
102. E.g., 147 U.S. at 107.
103. 75 Minn. 368, 77 N.W. 985 (1899).
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which he received from a disenchanted constituent. The telegram had
been accepted and transmitted by an agent of the company. The
plaintiff argued that the act of the agent was sufficient to hold the com-
pany liable.'°4 The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed, largely because
of the degree of control exercised by the agent and because the choice
of agents belonged solely to the company. "One who employs another
to do an act for his benefit, and who has the choice of the agent, ought
to take the risk of injury to third persons by the manner in which he
does the business."' 0 5
While the policy most often mentioned for requiring ratification or
authorization is punishment of the wrongdoer, the supposed deterrent
effect of punitive damages is frequently cited by courts not requiring
intentional acts. The concern for deterrence was central to the deci-
sion in Smith's Administratrix v. MAiddleton, 0 6 a Kentucky case involv-
ing mislabeling of drugs which resulted in a young boy's death. In a
wrongful death action, punitive damages were sought against the drug-
gist for the gross negligence of the druggist's clerk. The plaintiff ap-
pealed the trial court's refusal to submit the question of punitive
damages to the jury.10 7 The appellate court reversed and remanded,
holding that evidence of the clerk's gross negligence was sufficient to
require submission of the question of punitive damages against the
druggist to the jury. 0 8 In so holding, the court indicated that to do
otherwise would induce other employers to "conduct [specially hazard-
ous business] by the means of financially irresponsible agents ... ."109
Although this case dealt with a "specially hazardous business," the
court did not expressly limit its holding to such situations alone.
Therefore, it is clear that in the appropriate case the assumed deterrent
effect of punitive damages will be persuasive to a court which does not
require an intentional act by an employer.
In a sense the only real difference between the theory holding the
employer liable if he is found to have the requisite intent and the the-
ory that the employer may be liable even without intent is the point at
which authorization or ratification is found to have taken place. The
theory holding the employer liable even without intent merely infers
authorization from the fact that an employer hires a person and gives
him authority to carry out certain tasks. If, while the employee carries
104. Id at 371, 77 N.W. at 985.
105. Id. at 373, 77 N.W. at 986.
106. 112 Ky. 588, 66 S.W. 388 (1902).
107. Id. at 593-94, 66 S.W. at 388.
108. Id at 596, 66 S.W. at 389-90.
109. Id. at 596, 66 S.W. at 389.
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out his responsibilities-while he is acting within the scope of his em-
ployment-he becomes liable for punitive damages, his employer be-
comes liable also, by virtue of his prior authorization to do the tasks
from which the injuries arose."10 The group of cases holding an em-
ployer liable only if there is a finding of intent requires an additional
act of authorization, showing in effect, the employer's wrongful intent.
Under this approach, while the employee was authorized to act on be-
half of his employer by virtue of his employment, he is said to have a
duty to exercise due care and to act without malice or recklessness.
Authorization, then, results from an act subsequent to, rather than con-
temporaneous with, the hiring of the employee. The consequence of
this difference in viewpoint should not be overlooked. Under the ap-
proach not requiring intent, an employer may be assessed punitive
damages for no other reason than that he hired the wrongdoer in the
first place. Care in hiring does not necessarily obviate this liability.
The question is not whether the employer exercised due care in hiring
the employee, nor whether the employee has demonstrated any propen-
sity toward recklessness; the question is whether the specific act which
caused the injury is one which may give rise to punitive damages. '1 ' If
no specific intentional act is required of the employer, the imposition of
punitive damages against him certainly becomes more probable.
The Approach of the Restatement of Torts
The drafters of the Restatement of Torts adopted an intermediate
position on the issue of whether an employer may be held liable for
punitive damages for an act of his employee absent a finding of intent.
The Restatement declares that the purpose of punitive damages is to
punish a person for his "outrageous"' 1 2 acts, a position seemingly more
in harmony with a requirement of intent. Yet the official comment to
this section states that punitive damages are also intended to "discour-
age" persons from repeating such outrageous acts." 3 Therefore, the
deterrent effect of punitive damages, which receives greater emphasis
when intent is not required, is also recognized.
According to the Restatement, punitive damages may be awarded
against a principal only under certain specified conditions. Two of
these conditions are authorization and ratification by the principal or a
110. "When one person invests another with authority to act as his agent for a specified pur-
pose, all of the acts done by the agent . . . within the scope of his agency, are . . . regarded as
really the acts of the principal." Rucker v. Smoke, 37 S.C. 377, 380, 16 S.E. 40, 41 (1892).
Il1. Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton, 112 Ky. 588, 593, 66 S.W. 388, 388 (1902).
112. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1934).
113. Id., Comment a.
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manager. 114 The Restatement thus incorporates the two voluntary acts
required by the rule requiring authorization or ratification. However,
subsection (c) also recognizes the rule which does not require a volun-
tary action in situations in which the agent was employed in a manage-
rial position by allowing punitive damages when the managerial agent
was "acting in the scope of employment.""' 5 Comment (a) clearly
states that this subsection is intended to act as a deterrent to the careless
hiring of persons who will be acting in the place of the employer."t 6
The fourth condition under which an employer may be liable rec-
ognizes a duty on the part of an employer to exercise due care in hiring.
Under subsection (b), a principal or employer may be liable if "the
agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him."' ' 7
This specific ground of liability has received minimal attention in the
past from courts which have not applied the Restatement to cases in-
volving punitive damages." t8 However, in cases involving an em-
ployer's liability for compensatory damages this theory has received
much more attention.' '9  It should be noted that, under this
Restatement subsection, if the agent or employee is found to be unfit
for his position and the principal or employer is found to have been
"reckless" in hiring him, there is liability regardless of whether the
wrongful act was within the scope of employment.
While clearly more limiting than the rule not requiring intent, as
stated in its most unequivocal form, the Restatement recognizes that an
employer may ratify the acts of his employee (1) merely by having the
employee in his employ when the employer was reckless in hiring an
unfit person or (2) when the employee was acting in a managerial ca-
pacity. 20  In other words, the employer may be found to have author-
114. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of
an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or...
(d) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909(a), (d) (1934).
115. Id. § 909(c).
116. "[Wihere a person acting in a managerial capacity either does an outrageous act or ap-
proves of such an act by a subordinate, the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer
serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important positions." RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 909, Comment a (1934).
117. Id. § 909(b).
118. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
119. For a comparison of the negligent hiring theory with the theory of respondeat superior,
and for the relevant case law, see Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their
Employees: The Negligent Hiring Theory oLiability, 53 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 717 (1977).
120. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 (1934). In the tentative draft of this section for the Re-
statement (Second) ofTorts, the drafting committee has questioned whether the position taken in
this section is "right," or at least whether the examples given therein should be omitted. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). Unfortunately, the objections
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ized his employee's outrageous acts merely by authorizing the
employee to act on his behalf.' 2' Thus, the Restatement extends an
employer's liability to acts which he probably would never be found to
have ratified, but for which he is at least partially blameworthy by rea-
son of his placing an unfit person in a position to do the act.
A New York court has utilized this subsection to uphold an award
of punitive damages against the State of New York. 122 At issue was
whether the state should be held liable for hiring a known alcoholic as
a "therapeutic aide" in a state hospital. The court held that the em-
ployee was unfit for the specific position for which he was hired, al-
though he might have been fit for a less "sensitive" position. 23
Clearly the state did not authorize or ratify the employee's assault upon
a patient, nor was such an assault within the "scope of employment."
Yet punitive damages were assessed in a situation in which the em-
ployer might have escaped punitive liability altogether under either of
the other two theories.
To date the Restatement has been adopted by six states. 124 Its af-
finity to the rule requiring intent is exemplified by the fact.that five of
the six states which have adopted the Restatement formerly followed
this rule.' 25 In addition, the only states which have expressly rejected
the Restatement, are states which adhere to the rule which does not
require intent.' 26 The courts which have adopted the Restatement
have generally done so without comment, a fact which is a further indi-
cation of the perceived affinity of the Restatement to the rule already in
force. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, altered the rule some-
prompting the questions were not published. Since the section was permitted to stand in substan-
tially its present form, it must be assumed that the objections were not serious enough to warant
making wholesale changes in this section. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1976).
121. See text accompanying notes 88-91, supra.
122. Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1975).
123. Id. at 510, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
124. The six states are California, Hale v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (1975); Idaho, Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971);
Illinois, Tolle v. Interstate Systems Truck Lines, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 356 N.E.2d 625 (1976);
New York, Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App. Div. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1954); Oregon,
Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790 (1975); Texas, King v. McGulf, 149 Tex. 432, 234
S.W.2d 403 (1950).
125. These five states are California, Warner v. Southern Pac. Co., 113 Cal. 105, 45 P. 187
(1896); Idaho, Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281 (1948);
New York, Cleghorn v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 56 N.Y. 44 (1874); Oregon, Gill v. Selling,
125 Or. 587, 267 P. 812 (1928); Texas, Ft. Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d
397 (1934).
Illinois is apparently the only state to switch from the rule which requires no intentional act
to the rule of the Restatement. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Herring, 57 Ill. 59 (1870). See also
text accompanying notes 129-132 infra.
126. Arizona, Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz. App. 336, 452 P.2d 117 (1969); Mary-
land, Carl M. Freeman Assoc., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. 419, 306 A.2d 548 (1973).
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what by removing the distinction between employees in a managerial
capacity and so-called "menial" employees in the case of corporate em-
ployers. 27 As a result, a corporate employer may be liable if any em-
ployee commits the requisite outrageous act within the scope of his
employment. 28 Presumably, the rule remains intact for non-corporate
employers.
At least one court has recognized that the Restatement rule may
well be the best way to balance the policies of punishment and deter-
rence. In Tolle v. Interstate Systems Truck Lines, Inc.,129 an Illinois
court questioned the effectiveness of the broad rule of liability in deter-
ring employers from engaging in careless hiring and supervisory prac-
tices.' 30 The Tolle court pointed out that greater supervision is not
always possible and not always effective to prevent certain torts from
being committed. 13' Since the Restatement allows recovery in situa-
tions involving some fault on the part of the employer, the court felt
that the "institutional conscience" of the employer would be sufficiently
aroused to exercise due care, while the employer would be protected
from liability in cases involving little or no fault on his part. 132
RECOMMENDATIONS
To permit punitive damages against employers only in those cases
in which the employer has authorized or ratified his employee's wrong-
ful act is to emphasize the punitive effect rather than the deterrent ef-
fect of punitive damages. This narrow rule of liability also assumes
that "guilt," or perhaps responsibility, for a particular act can arise only
as a result of some act in addition to the actual hiring, instructing, and
supervision of one's employees. The practical effect of this require-
ment is to place a heavy burden of proof upon a plaintiff seeking to
implicate an employer in his employee's acts. The plaintiff must offer
some proof of the employer's participation, not only in the wrongful
act, but in the wrongful intent. 33 Since evidence of authorization or
ratification is likely to be within the exclusive control of the employer,
proof may consist of a series of reasonable inferences, with recovery
dependent upon the effectiveness of discovery and a sympathetic jury.
127. Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 792 (Or. 1975).
128. Id. at 793.
129. 42 11. App. 3d 771, 356 N.E.2d 625 (1976).
130. Id. at 773, 356 N.E.2d at 627.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying notes 17-19, supra.
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On the other hand, to assess punitive damages whenever the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his employment and for his em-
ployer's benefit virtually eliminates any requisite showing of
wrongdoing on the part of the employer. The emphasis here is on de-
terrence, forcing an employer to exercise greater care in his hiring prac-
tices and supervision of employees. Yet even the exercise of the
greatest degree of care cannot assure that liability will not arise. Fur-
thermore, even if it is assumed that an employer should be liable for all
the acts of his employees in the scope of their duties, there is nothing to
indicate that employers are generally aware of such liability, or that
considerations of liability have any more effect upon hiring practices
than do ordinary business considerations. 134 This broad rule of liabil-
ity could, however, significantly increase a plaintiffs chances of a larger
recovery, since it is generally easier to establish liability when no vol-
untary act is required other than the initial hiring of the employee. A
sizeable judgment for punitive damages, however, does not necessarily
mean that the policy of holding employers responsible for their em-
ployees' conduct has had the intended effect. The prudent employer
will insure against such losses, add the cost of the premiums to his cost
of doing business, and thereby transfer the risk to the ultimate con-
sumer of his product. 35
The question which arises, then, is whether it is realistic even to
pay lip service to the policies of punishment and deterrence. Perhaps
these are not so much policies as justifications for imposing liability
according to a particular rule. A better course is to examine the role of
the employer, determine at what points he exercises judgment which
could affect third persons either directly or indirectly, and hold him
liable for gross errors of judgment at those points.
The initial judgment made by an employer is in determining a per-
son's fitness to serve in a specific capacity. This decision is actually a
series of judgments relating to the person, the job, and relevant eco-
nomic considerations. Ultimately, the employer determines that a per-
son is fit and thereupon vests him with the requisite authority to
perform his assigned job. At this point, the employer has subjected the
public to the consequences of his judgment and he should be liable to
the extent that his judgment is faulty. This liability should extend to
134. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1931); Morris,
Punitive Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216 (1960); Ghiardi, The Case Against
Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); and Note, The Assessment ofPunitive Damages Against an
Entrepreneurfor the Malicious Torts of/His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
135. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, and Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal
Injury Cases.
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punitive damages where the fault results in appropriately outrageous
conduct by the employee resulting in injury to a third person. How-
ever, under the approach requiring wrongful intent, it is doubtful that
punitive damages would be awarded, unless there was a further show-
ing of authorization by the employer.
In this regard an employer's error in judgment can manifest itself
in several ways. For example, the employee may perform his job in a
reckless or irresponsible manner, thereby causing an injury. The ques-
tion remains, though, whether the employer should be liable for all
such abuses of authority. Clearly, if the employee is in a position in
which he has authority to act on behalf of the employer, his abuse of
authority is, by implication, an abuse by the employer himself. On the
other hand, the authority to perform menial labor, for example, is very
limited authority. If in the exercise of that authority, but without the
knowledge of the employer, the employee acts maliciously and thereby
injures a third party, it is doubtful that there is sufficient justification to
hold the employer liable for punitive damages. The approach which
does not require intent would, nonetheless, impose liability for punitive
damages in this situation.
If the employer expressly instructed the employee to perform his
menial labor in a manner which endangered the public, the employer
has now acted to authorize a malicious act. This act is the second
point at which an employer exercises his judgment in such a way as to
affect third parties. In giving specific instruction or in acting in such a
way as to give rise to a reasonable inference that a particular act is
desired, the employer is granting his employee additional authority to
act in a specific manner. Clearly, the employer should be chargeable
with the consequences of this exercise of judgment, and under all three
approaches discussed in this note, the employer would, in fact, be lia-
ble.
Suppose that the employer has authorized his employee to act with
ordinary care in performing his menial tasks. The employee has then
maliciously engaged in tortious activity while he is working and the
employer has been so informed. The employer has determined that
the report is accurate and is faced with a decision. He must decide
whether he should discipline the employee or possibly even terminate
his employment to indicate his disapproval, or whether he should per-
mit the incident to pass, hoping that there will be no repetition thereof.
If the employer expresses his disapproval by disciplinary action or ter-
mination, he has done virtually all that he could reasonably have been
expected to do. Regardless of the plaintiff's desire to recover as large
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an award as possible, the employer has done nothing to warrant receiv-
ing the burden of punitive damages. Yet under the approach which
requires no showing of wrongful intent, the employer would still be
liable for punitive damages.
If, on the other hand, knowing of his employee's conduct, he has
retained the employee and has foregone disciplinary action, he has im-
pliedly indicated that in his judgment, such behavior is acceptable de-
spite the injuries which may result. This exercise of his judgment has
indicated his intent to permit additional acts of this type by his em-
ployee, and therefore has subjected the public to the possibility of fu-
ture injuries at the hands of his employees. In this case it would not be
surprising if a jury found that he deserved to be punished so that he
would realize that the public did not approve of such acts. Punitive
damages would be appropriate for the manner in which the employer
exercised judgment, and under all three approaches such damages
would probably be assessed.
From the foregoing it can be seen that an employer's judgment
affects the public interest at the following points: when he hires a per-
son and vests him with specified authority and responsibilities, when he
places an employee in a managerial position in which the employee has
authority to exercise judgment on behalf of his employer, when the em-
ployer directs an employee to perform a certain act or to perform an act
in a specified manner, and when the employer either implicitly or ex-
plicitly approves an act already performed by his employee. If at any
of these points an employer is properly chargeable with exercising his
judgment in a malicious or reckless manner, he should be answerable
for punitive damages.
Of the three theories discussed in this note, only that expressed by
the Restatement clearly holds an employer liable in each of the above
situations and only in these situations. If liability is imposed regard-
less of wrongful intent, punitive damages may be assessed in situations
in which the employer has either exercised his judgment carefully or
has had no opportunity to exercise judgment, as in a situation in which
an employee hired with care acts maliciously while beyond the knowl-
edge and control of the employer. If, on the other hand, a specific
showing of intent is required, punitive damages may be avoided by an
employer who exercised faulty judgment either in hiring or in vesting
managerial authority. For these reasons the Restatement theory, by
covering all the above situations, is preferable to the other two theories.
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CONCLUSION
While some states impose liability for punitive damages upon em-
ployers without any showing of wrongful intent at the time of the in-
jury, other states require a showing of an intentional act of
authorization or ratification on the part of the employer. The drafters
of the Restatement of Torts have developed a theory which, while tend-
ing toward the latter theory, also holds an employer liable for wrongful
acts not strictly related to the actual injury suffered, but related to the
degree of care exercised in choosing employees or placing them in posi-
tions of authority. This theory is more rational in its approach and
provides for punitive damages in all appropriate situations.
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